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Abstract
Background: Physician non-compliance with clinical practice guidelines remains a critical barrier to high quality care.
Serious games (using gaming technology for serious purposes) have emerged as a method of studying physician decision
making. However, little is known about their validity.
Methods: We created a serious game and evaluated its construct validity. We used the decision context of trauma triage in
the Emergency Department of non-trauma centers, given widely accepted guidelines that recommend the transfer of
severely injured patients to trauma centers. We designed cases with the premise that the representativeness heuristic
influences triage (i.e. physicians make transfer decisions based on archetypes of severely injured patients rather than
guidelines). We randomized a convenience sample of emergency medicine physicians to a control or cognitive load arm,
and compared performance (disposition decisions, number of orders entered, time spent per case). We hypothesized that
cognitive load would increase the use of heuristics, increasing the transfer of representative cases and decreasing the
transfer of non-representative cases.
Findings: We recruited 209 physicians, of whom 168 (79%) began and 142 (68%) completed the task. Physicians transferred
31% of severely injured patients during the game, consistent with rates of transfer for severely injured patients in practice.
They entered the same average number of orders in both arms (control (C): 10.9 [SD 4.8] vs. cognitive load (CL):10.7 [SD 5.6],
p = 0.74), despite spending less time per case in the control arm (C: 9.7 [SD 7.1] vs. CL: 11.7 [SD 6.7] minutes, p,0.01).
Physicians were equally likely to transfer representative cases in the two arms (C: 45% vs. CL: 34%, p = 0.20), but were more
likely to transfer non-representative cases in the control arm (C: 38% vs. CL: 26%, p= 0.03).
Conclusions: We found that physicians made decisions consistent with actual practice, that we could manipulate cognitive
load, and that load increased the use of heuristics, as predicted by cognitive theory.
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Introduction
Understanding why physicians fail to follow clinical practice
guidelines has occupied researchers and policy makers for the past
four decades. [1–4] The dual-process model of cognitive reasoning
may help to explain the persistent gap between normative
standards and practice patterns. [5] This model posits that two
systems of cognitive operations shape judgments: system one
(heuristic) processes function intuitively, relying on pattern
recognition for answers; system two (analytic) processes function
more laboriously, incorporating rule-based deductions. The
relative weight exerted by these two systems depends on the
characteristics of the task (time-pressure, cognitive load) and the
person making the judgment (expertise, motivation). [6] Under-
standing the roles of these different processes is vital for improving
decision making.
People have imperfect introspective access to their own
judgment, and so cannot accurately explain why they do things.
[7] As a result, researchers must draw inferences about cognitive
processes by examining decisions made under systematically
varying conditions. Existing methods have known limitations.
For example, paper vignettes with static descriptions have unclear
external validity; direct observation rarely allows manipulation of
task conditions; live simulation requires costly investments in
infrastructure and data collection. [8–12] We offer a new tool for
studying those processes, serious games, which use gaming
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technology to create realistic versions of clinical problems. Serious
games can, in principle, retain clinical validity by simulating
representative task environments, while allowing the experimental
manipulation of task conditions that can reveal cognitive processes
[13]. After the initial investment in their creation, they can be
implemented relatively inexpensively. However, little is known
about their validity in this context. [14] The present study fills
some of that gap.
The objective of the study was to evaluate the construct validity
of a serious game for studying physician decision making, by
measuring a) the game’s external validity; b) our ability to
manipulate one task condition, cognitive load; and c) participants’
responses to those manipulation, in terms of their consistency with
predictions based on cognitive theory, specifically predicting
increased reliance on heuristics under greater cognitive load.
Methods
We used the decision context of trauma triage in the Emergency
Department of non-trauma centers, and recruited a convenience
sample of physicians at a national meeting of the American
College of Emergency Physicians in the fall of 2013.
Conceptual Model
Trauma triage exemplifies decisions made under time pressure and
uncertainty, where physicians’ abilities to identify rare events have
important implications for patient outcomes.Moreover, it is a context
where practice patterns often deviate from guidelines, despite
intensive quality improvement interventions by major professional
stakeholders. [15–17] The American College of Surgeons provides
widely-known guidelines for identifying severely injured patients who
should receive care at trauma centers. [15] However, among patients
with severe injuries who present initially to non-trauma centers, only
one-third are transferred to a higher level of care. [16,7]
The specific hypotheses that we pursued arose from the
conjunction of clinical experience, retrospective data analyses,
and decision science research. [18–21] We developed a conceptual
model of physician triage decisions as the product of judgment
(information processing and probability estimation) and choice
(selection between available alternatives). [22] In other words,
physicians have to judge the severity of the injury, and then choose
how to manage it. Judgment arises from the interaction between
system one (fast, heuristic) processes and system two (slow,
analytic) processes. [5] As things speed up, people rely more
heavily on heuristics (or cognitive shortcuts) that are often useful,
but can lead them astray. As things slow down, they are better able
to synthesize the complex, uncertain elements of more difficult
decisions (assuming that they have the training to do so). [6,23]
Choice reflects variables such as physician attitudes towards the
guidelines, outcome expectancy, institutional norms, regional
resource constraints, and patient preferences. [17,24]
We wanted to understand the influence of system one processes
on trauma triage decision making. Our prediction for the
expression of heuristic thinking was based on our clinical
experience. For example, we had observed that patients with
gunshot wounds were far more likely to be transferred to a trauma
center than patients who had fallen, for any given injury severity
score. [18,25] That pattern is consistent with reliance on the
representativeness heuristic, whereby the likelihood of an outcome
depends on how well the case fits (or represents) the process
involved. [21] Thus, physicians relying on the heuristic would
interpret actual cases in terms of an archetype of what happens
when people are shot or fall, then use that match as their default
diagnosis. They would require stronger evidence, and time to
think, to conclude otherwise. To the extent that transfer decisions
reflect the use of heuristics, increased cognitive load should
increase adherence with clinical practice guidelines where
heuristics match the guidelines (representative cases) and physi-
cians reach the right decision more quickly, despite less thorough
examination. It should decrease adherence where heuristics do not
match the guidelines (non-representative cases) and physicians lack
the time to double check their thinking.
Case Development
In previous work, we developed and validated 30 static paper-
based trauma case vignettes. [18,26] We selected 12 cases (6 with
severe injuries and 6 with minor injuries) and developed them into
branching vignettes. Among the cases describing patients with
severe injuries, we included two representative cases (e.g. gunshot
wound to abdomen) and four non-representative cases (e.g. fall
with multiple rib fractures). We made the patient’s age and
hemodynamic stability on presentation orthogonal to the repre-
sentativeness of the case, so that we could distinguish the effect of
the injury complex from other variables known to influence
decision making. [18–20] We created an additional eight non-
trauma cases, four with critical illnesses and four with routine
complaints to serve as clinical distractors. [Table 1]
Serious game development
The term ‘serious games’ refer to all computer games that have
a purpose other than pure entertainment, such as education,
behavior change, or scientific research. [14] These games can
range from virtual simulations to more imaginary or abstract tasks.
However, they rely on the engagement and challenge of game play
to facilitate their objectives. [13,14]
Our serious game simulates the environment of an Emergency
Department (ED) at a non-trauma center. We collaborated with a
gaming company (Breakaway Ltd; Hunt Valley, MD) to transfer the
paper vignettes into a 2-D serious game. Participants had to evaluate
and manage ten cases over 42 minutes, simulating a busy eight-hour
ED shift. New patients arrived at pre-specified (but unpredictable)
intervals, so that physicians had to manage multiple patients
concurrently. Each case included a 2-D rendering of the patient, a
chief complaint, vital signs which updated every 30 seconds, a history,
and a written description of the physical exam.[Figure 1A] In the
absence of clinical intervention by the physician ‘‘player,’’ severely
injured patients and critically ill distractor patients decompensated
and died over the course of the game.
Physicians indicated their decisions about how to manage
patients by selecting from a pre-specified list of 250 medications,
studies, and procedures.[Figure 1B] Some orders affected patients’
clinical status, leading to corresponding changes in their vital signs
and physical exam. Other orders generated additional informa-
tion, presented as reports added to the patients’ charts. The cases
ended when physicians either made a disposition decision (admit,
discharge, transfer) or the patient died.
We included several design elements to enhance the verisimil-
itude of the experience. For example, in addition to their clinical
responsibilities, players also had to respond to audio-visual
distractors, including nursing requests for help with disruptive
patients, interruptions by families asking for information, and
paging alerts from administrators.[Figure 1C] We returned new
information in a time-delayed fashion, corresponding to that in
actual practice (but scaled to simulation time). For example, the
results of a chest x-ray returned after two minutes, while the results
of a CT scan required a five-minute wait. A clock at the top of the
screen helped players to track the passage of time. We did specify
that physicians could not make a disposition decision for
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hemodynamically unstable patients (e.g. systolic blood pressure ,
90), in order to prevent physicians from deflecting responsibility
for potentially challenging cases. Finally, we provided no
incentives beyond physicians’ intrinsic desire to perform well.
Game pre-testing
One person (DM) developed the branching vignettes based on
existing validated vignettes (trauma cases) and case histories (non-
trauma cases), and edited them based on the input of six content
experts (three trauma surgeons and three emergency medicine
physicians). After iterative pre-tests of game elements, we beta-tested
a prototype among emergency medicine physicians practicing at non-
trauma centers (N=30). In response to feedback, we added
additional orders, changed the clinical parameters of two cases,
reduced the number of distractors, and increased the duration of the
simulation from 28 to 42 minutes.
Demographic survey
Each physician completed a 16-item questionnaire assessing
age, sex, race, educational background (board certification, ATLS
certification, years since completion of residency), and practice
environment (trauma designation of their hospital, affiliation with
a Level I/II trauma center, affiliation with an EM residency
program, presence of consultants [e.g. orthopedic surgeons]).
Experimental protocol
After subjects logged in, they completed the demographic
questionnaire and then were randomized to the control arm or to
the experimental arm of cognitive load. We operationalized
cognitive load in two ways. First, we varied the complexity of the
non-trauma cases. In the control arm, non-trauma cases had
routine complaints (e.g. appendicitis), arrived hemodynamically
stable, and did not deteriorate over the course of the game. In the
cognitive load arm, non-trauma cases were critically ill (e.g. had
sepsis), arrived hemodynamically unstable, and deteriorated
without adequate management. Second, we reduced the number
of rooms that physicians could use to evaluate patients, from eight
in the control arm to four in the cognitive load arm. As a result,
physicians in the cognitive load arm received an increased number
of reminders from the nurse to complete cases because of patients
queuing in the waiting room.
Physicians evaluated ten cases: three severely injured patients
(one representative, two-non-representative), three minimally
injured patients, and four non-trauma cases (either all with critical
illness or all with routine complaints).[Table 1] After physicians
completed all ten cases, or the eight-hour shift ended, they had the
opportunity to provide feedback about the game. Physicians who
completed the study received a $100 honorarium.
Table 1. Case Descriptions.
Control Cognitive Load
Trauma Cases Severe s/p fall with epidural hematoma with seizure
on presentation [NR]
s/p fall with epidural hematoma with seizure on presentation
[NR]
s/p motor vehicle collision with aortic transection [NR] s/p motor vehicle collision with aortic transection [NR]
s/p motor cycle collision with open book pelvic
fracture with hemodynamic instability
on presentation [R]
s/p motor cycle collision with open book pelvic fracture with
hemodynamic instability on presentation [R]
s/p motor cycle collision with open humerus
fracture with no distal perfusion [NR]
s/p motor cycle collision with open humerus fracture with no
distal perfusion [NR]
s/p pedestrian versus car with multiple rib
fractures; subdural hematoma [NR]
s/p pedestrian versus car with multiple rib fractures; subdural
hematoma [NR]
s/p gunshot wound to abdomen with grade
IV liver laceration and hemodynamic instability on
presentation [R]
s/p gunshot wound to abdomen with grade IV liver laceration
and hemodynamic instability on presentation [R]
Minor s/p bicycle v. auto with distal radius/ulnar fracture s/p bicycle v. auto with distal radius/ulnar fracture
s/p motor cycle collision with concussion s/p motor cycle collision with concussion
s/p assault with concussion s/p assault with concussion
s/p motor vehicle collision with chest pain s/p motor vehicle collision with chest pain
s/p gunshot wound to left calf, right thumb,
and right buttock
s/p gunshot wound to left calf, right thumb, and right buttock
s/p motor vehicle collision with left mandibular fracture s/p motor vehicle collision with left mandibular fracture
Non-trauma cases Routine Appendicitis
Abscess of arm
Headache
Non-cardiac chest pain
Critically ill Hypertensive sub-arachnoid hemorrhage
Decompensated congestive heart failure with respiratory failure
Diverticular bleed with hemodynamic instability
Sepsis with hemodynamic instability
NR – non-representative; R – representative.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105445.t001
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Statistical Analyses
Physician Sample. We calculated the response rate as the
proportion of enrolled physicians who logged into the website, and
the completion rate as the proportion who completed the game.
We summarized physician characteristics using means (standard
deviation [SD]) for continuous variables and proportions (%) for
categorical variables, and compared the distribution of character-
istics between the control and experimental groups using Students
t-test and chi-squares as appropriate.
User Experience. We categorized qualitative feedback relat-
ed to the quality of the game, as positive or negative, and further
categorized negative feedback as concerns about the verisimilitude
of the task or technical problems when playing the game. We
include a sample of participants’ feedback in an Appendix.[Ap-
pendix S1]
Reliability. We measured the consistency with which physi-
cians made disposition decisions for severely injured patients
(internal reliability) using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.
Evaluating the external validity of game play. We
summarized the types of diagnostic (CT scan, x-rays, labs),
therapeutic (medications, procedures, consults), and disposition
decisions for trauma cases. We specifically used two decisions,
well-described in the literature, to evaluate the external validity of
game play: the mean number of severely injured patients
transferred to a trauma center and the mean number of CT
scans acquired prior to transfer. [16,17,25]
Evaluating the effectiveness of the experimental
manipulation. We excluded cases that were not completed at
the conclusion of the game (i.e., the patient was alive but had no
disposition status). We compared the number of orders, time spent
on each trauma case, and types of disposition decisions in the
control and cognitive load arms using Students t-test and chi-
square as appropriate. We hypothesized that cognitive load would
worsen performance. Given the association between delay in triage
and outcome, we defined better performance as a) fewer orders
entered, b) less time spent on each case, and c) more severely
injured patients transferred to trauma centers as recommended by
the clinical practice guidelines. We also examined the effect of
cognitive load on two classes of cases for which physicians typically
make the right decision easily: hemodynamic unstable ones and
younger ones (,65). [19,25]. We expected higher error rates
under cognitive load.
Evaluating the influence of heuristics on decision
making. To evaluate the influence of heuristics on decision
making, we compared the mean number of transfer decisions for
representative and non-representative severely injured patients
using chi-square tests.
Human Subjects and Power Calculation
We designed the experiment to capture a moderate effect (one-
half a standard deviation) of cognitive load on transfer decisions
for representative and non-representative cases with an alpha of
0.05 and a power of 80%. [27] Anticipating a 60% response rate,
we recruited 200 physicians at a national meeting of the American
College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) in the fall of 2013.
Physicians were eligible for participation if they cared for adult
patients in the Emergency Department of either a non-trauma
center or a Level III/IV trauma center in the United States. The
University of Pittsburgh Institutional Review Board study
reviewed and approved the study (IRB# PRO13090138). We
conducted all analyses and data management with STATA 12/SE
(College Station, TX).
Results
Sample
Among the 209 physicians recruited at ACEP, 168 logged on to
the website (79%), and 142 (68%) completed the game. The mean
age of the physicians completing the game was 43 years
(SD=10.7). 135 (95%) were Emergency Medicine residency
trained, and 113 (80%) were certified in Advanced Trauma Life
Figure 1. Screen shots of serious game. A) Each case included a 2-
D rendering of the patient, a chief complaint, vital signs, a history, and a
written description of the physical exam. Physicians had 42 minutes (a
simulated 8 hour shift) to complete the ten cases. A clock at the top
right of the screen helped track the passage of time. B) Physicians could
manage patients by selecting from a pre-specified list of 250
medications, studies, and procedures. C) We included audio-visual
distractors, including nursing requests for help with disruptive patients
to increase the verisimilitude of the experience.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105445.g001
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Support. 80 (56%) worked in a hospital affiliated with a Level I/II
trauma center, 136 (96%) had a general surgeon available on call,
and 72 (51%) had a neurosurgeon available. Participant charac-
teristics did not differ between the control and cognitive load
arms.[Table 2]
User experience
Among physicians who completed the game, 70 (49%) were
randomized to the control arm, and 72 (51%) were randomized to
the cognitive load arm. [Figure 2] 71 (50%) physicians left
feedback about their experience; 45 (63%) described the experi-
ence as engaging; 16 (23%) complained about verisimilitude
problems with the game as a whole; and 10 (14%) described
technical problems with its operation.
Construct Validation
Reliability. Physicians made similar disposition decisions for
cases that described severely injured patients, suggesting the
instrument had acceptable internal reliability (Cronbach’s al-
pha= 0.72).
Evaluating the external validity of game play. Physicians
transferred 31% of severely injured patients. They obtained CT
scans for 62% of patients they transferred. These results are similar
to actual practice rates of 30% and 57–67%, respectively.
[16,17,25,29]
Evaluating the effectiveness of the experimental
manipulation. Physicians completed 80% of the cases in the
control arm and 78% in the cognitive load arm (p= 0.5). The
frequency of death did not differ between arms (control (C): 7% vs.
cognitive load (CL): 10%; p= 0.1). Physicians entered the same
mean number of orders in both the control and cognitive load
arms (C:10.9 [SD 4.8] vs. CL: 10.7 [SD 5.6], p = 0.74). However,
they were more likely to make the appropriate decision to transfer
severely injured patients to trauma centers in the control arm than
in the cognitive load arm (C: 40% v. CL: 28%, p= 0.01). Those
improved decisions occurred despite participants spending less
time per case in the control arm than in the cognitive load arm (C:
9.7 [SD 7.1] vs. CL: 11.7 [SD 6.7] minutes, p,0.01).
Physicians in the control arm transferred hemodynamically
unstable patients (C: 49% vs. CL: 28%, p,0.01) and younger
patients to trauma centers (C: 44% vs. CL: 27%, p,0.01) more
frequently than in the cognitive load arm.
Evaluating the influence of heuristics on decision
making. Physicians were equally likely to transfer representative
cases in the two arms (C: 45% vs. CL: 34%; p= 0.20), but were
more likely to transfer non-representative cases in the control arm
(C: 38% vs. CL: 26%; p= 0.03). [Figure 3]
Discussion
In this convenience sample of ACEP attendees, key findings
support the validity of using serious game technology to study
physician decision making. The pattern of decisions made during
the game appears consistent with actual practice patterns. The
experimental manipulation of task conditions had the desired
effect on cognitive load. The experimental manipulation changed
decision making in ways consistent with predictions based on
cognitive theory.
Table 2. Participant characteristics by exposure to cognitive load.
Control n =70 Cognitive Load n=72 p
Demographic Characteristics
Age (year, SD) 42 (10.2) 43 (11) 0.9
Female (n,%) 13 (19) 17 (24) 0.5
Race, (n, %) 0.32
White 52 (75) 59 (82)
Asian 9 (13) 9 (13)
American Indian 2 (3) 0 (0)
Black 1 (1) 2 (3)
Other 6 (9) 2 (3)
Educational Training
Completed or completing an emergency medicine residency (n, %) 68 (97) 66 (92) 0.16
Completing residency (n, %) 5 (7) 6 (8) 0.41
ATLS* certification present (n, %) 55 (79) 58 (81) 0.77
Also working at a Level I/II trauma center (n, %) 16 (23) 12 (16) 0.49
Characteristics of Practice Environment
Is there a trauma center affiliated with their hospital (n,%) 44 (63) 36 (50) 0.12
Number of EDu beds (n, SD) 35 (37) 29 (23) 0.27
Number of ICU" beds (n, SD) 22 (21) 18 (15) 0.21
Is there an EM1 residency at their hospital (n,%) 17 (25) 20 (28) 0.64
Do they have a general surgeon on call (n,%) 66 (95) 70 (97) 0.38
Do they have a neurosurgeon on call (n,%) 38 (54) 34 (47) 0.40
Do they have an orthopedic surgeon on call (n,%) 63 (90) 68 (94) 0.32
*ATLS =Advanced Trauma Life Support; uED= Emergency Department; "ICU= Intensive Care Unit; 1EM= Emergency Medicine
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105445.t002
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Existing conceptual models of physician decision making have
ignored the influence of heuristics – in large part because of the
lack of empirical evidence. [1] However, heuristics may play an
important role in decision making, and do not respond to the same
types of quality improvement interventions as other determinants.
[28] Better tools for evaluating physician decision making are
essential for improving the quality of performance. Here we
provide proof-of-concept that serious games have the potential to
serve as an important method of studying physician decision
making. First, they elicit decisions consistent with actual practice.
In the decision context of the ED of a non-trauma center, we
found that physicians would transfer patients and obtain CT scans
at the same rate as they would in real-life. [16,17,25,29]
Second, serious games offer the opportunity to examine
decisions under systematically varying conditions. For example,
we found that we could successfully manipulate cognitive load.
Limits exist for human attentional and cognitive abilities. [30]
Numerous studies have demonstrated that as overall workload
increases, people develop more disorganized task routines, with
impaired capacity to deal with new demands. [31–34] We found
several indicators that performance deteriorated in the experi-
mental arm: time spent per case increased; transfer of severely
injured patients (i.e. compliance with clinical practice guidelines)
decreased. Additionally, during our exploration of determinants of
transfer patterns, we found that errors occurred specifically for the
‘easy’ cases. In practice, physicians typically transfer younger and
hemodynamically unstable patients to trauma centers. In the
Figure 2. Sampling frame for study. There was a 79% response rate and an 86% completion rate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0105445.g002
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experimental arm of the study, the rate of transfer for these
patients dropped. At first, this observation might appear paradox-
ical. However, the relationship between cognitive load and
inattentional blindness (a failure to observe salient cues when
distracted by competing demands on attention) is well-described.
[35,36] We hypothesize that treatment of young and unstable
patients in the experimental arm reflects the presence of
inattentional blindness, which in turn reinforces our conclusion
that they experienced greater cognitive load.
Finally, by allowing the observation of decision making under
different task conditions, serious games permit insight into the
cognitive processes that inform judgment. We found that transfer
rates of patients with severe injuries differed between arms in the
study, but only for those with non-representative patterns of
injuries. Based on our conceptual model of physician decision
making, a number of possible explanations exist for failures to
adhere to clinical practice guidelines. Physicians may choose not to
follow the guidelines, either because they do not agree with them
or because some external constraint (e.g. patient preferences,
institutional norms) precludes adherence. If true, then cognitive
load should have no influence on decision making. Alternatively,
physicians may choose to follow the guidelines but find the task
more difficult under conditions of cognitive load. If true, transfer
patterns should vary between arms of the study: either improving
under cognitive load as physicians consciously decide to respond to
the challenge by sending more patients to referral centers or by
worsening as physicians develop more disorganized work routines.
Regardless, differences in performance should occur consistently
for all cases. A third possibility is that physicians rely on their
heuristics to triage patients, which do not correspond exactly with
the clinical practice guidelines. If true, transfer patterns should
vary between arms of the study, but only for specific types of cases
(i.e. physicians will fail to transfer cases where discordance exists
between their intuitive judgments about the severity of the injury
and recommendations for best practice). Our observation is
therefore most consistent with the increased use of the represen-
tativeness heuristic to triage patients under conditions of stress.
Our study has several limitations. Given the small number of
cases, we are unable to comment on individual physicians’
cognitive process, but relied on aggregate evidence. Additionally,
we included a much higher proportion of severely injured patients
than occurs in practice, so as to have a task of tolerable length with
enough severely injured patients to evaluate our hypotheses. The
effect of base rates on decision making is hard to predict. [37,38]
However, the similarity of triage rates to actual practice patterns
suggests that the inflated base rate in our study did not significantly
modify decision making regarding individual cases. We also have
limited information about the game play experience of partici-
pants, which might have affected performance. Randomization
produced two groups with similar characteristics in all measured
attributes (age, experience, practice environment), suggesting that
the arms were similar in this respect as well. Finally, 23% of the
half of participants who provided feedback about the experience,
complained about the game’s verisimilitude. However, we found
similar practice patterns on the game as compared with real-life,
suggesting concerns about verisimilitude did not affect the external
validity of the instrument. These complaints were also equally
common in the two arms, hence should not have biased our
results.
Improving the quality of physician performance is a high
priority for multiple health care stakeholders. As a new source of
insight into these processes, we offer a serious game that appears
able to replicate the task environment, allowing us to manipulate
cognitive load, and reveal the possible role of heuristic thinking on
trauma triage decision making. Our results suggest that serious
game technology has potential as a method of evaluating physician
decision making and warrants further evaluation.
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Sample of feedback provided by participants after
completing the game.
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